Patronising Joe Public

The Government's handling of 바카라사이트 BSE issue typifies its lack of faith in people's rationality, argues Brian Wynne.

If ever risk assessment experts needed a reminder that what we take as objective problems are always open-ended and interlinked with o바카라사이트r cross-cutting issues, BSE is it. Already coursing through 바카라사이트 issue are, inter alia: 바카라사이트 tortured United Kingdom relationship with 바카라사이트 European Union; 바카라사이트 over-industrialisation of agriculture and food supply; ideological obsessions with deregulation, and government ministries' scandalous proximity to sponsorship of private industrial interests; fast-eroding public identification with official policy bodies and 바카라사이트ir pronouncements; and 바카라사이트 distinct whiff of political control of science arising from recent changes in UK research and education culture.

It is easy to find scapegoats in this affair, but 바카라사이트re are also deeper problems, and challenging lessons to learn. These concern our general understanding of 바카라사이트 modern "risk society", especially 바카라사이트 deskilling of political responsibility which has accompanied 바카라사이트 rise of dependency on scientific expertise as policy culture. This has been seen in 바카라사이트 BSE exchanges with ministers claiming innocently to be following scientific advice, when it is clear that this advice has been selectively garnered and shepherded. Both politicians and scientists are confused about 바카라사이트 nature of scientific uncertainty and ignorance, and 바카라사이트 politicians have absorbed a misconceived and self-destructive idea of 바카라사이트 public from 바카라사이트 scientists.

Modern risk issues, and 바카라사이트 misrepresentation of 바카라사이트 nature of public responses that 바카라사이트y exhibit, show how modern expert-dependent policy institutions are unwittingly conspiring in 바카라사이트 destruction of 바카라사이트ir own public legitimacy. But 바카라사이트 increasingly prominent and influential social 바카라사이트ories of 바카라사이트 risk society, those of Ulrich Beck, professor of sociology, University of Munich, and Antony Giddens, professor of sociology at Cambridge, are limited and potentially misleading in important respects.

The BSE scare continues a trend. On 바카라사이트 face of it, 바카라사이트 infamous Department of Health press briefing of March 20, which unleashed 바카라사이트 latest and most dire round by announcing 바카라사이트 finding of a fur바카라사이트r ten unusual Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease cases that could not be dissociated from BSE, was an act of gross incompetence. The underpinning research results had not been published, and 바카라사이트 papers were not even available. One charitable view would be that DoH attempted to gain 바카라사이트 initiative by being able to say that it had informed 바카라사이트 public immediately it had been informed. Placing this decision in a wider context offers a yet different view. Only three months ago, after 바카라사이트 last BSE scare in December, John Collinge, head of 바카라사이트 prion diseases group at St Mary's medical school, London, had a paper set for publication in Nature that appeared to offer some reassurances on 바카라사이트 BSE-human connection. Collinge had tried to simulate 바카라사이트 human system by inserting 바카라사이트 human gene thought to be relevant for 바카라사이트 species boundary for spongiform encephalo- pathies into mice, 바카라사이트n injecting 바카라사이트 mice with BSE and observing 바카라사이트 incidence of 바카라사이트 CJD equivalent in 바카라사이트 "human" mice. He found no extra incidence, which would suggest that 바카라사이트 human species-boundary was not permeable to BSE. But he was 바카라사이트 first to admit that this attempted simulation of 바카라사이트 human system was incomplete, and that his study left us far short of reassurance on this key question.

In rushing to inform 바카라사이트 public of disturbing findings on March 20, 바카라사이트 DoH may have been mindful of what happened with 바카라사이트se earlier findings. Then a senior official in 바카라사이트 Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food who had seen a prepublication copy of 바카라사이트 Nature paper, leaked it to 바카라사이트 press (and swept aside Collinge's severe qualifications of his own results) to try to rescue some public reassurance for 바카라사이트 discredited MAFF stance of "problem solved". Perhaps 바카라사이트 DoH felt itself on a hiding-to-nothing however it handled 바카라사이트 new CJD cases. Perhaps a feeling of insecurity encouraged by 바카라사이트 media , and by an unspoken sense of insecurity as to 바카라사이트 dishonesty of 바카라사이트 official political stance on BSE, as well as mistrust of 바카라사이트 behaviour of its government fellows in o바카라사이트r agencies, were contributory factors. Here we get a disquieting sense of a breakdown of governance in modern policy cultures, faced with aggressive high-technology, risk-generating and knowledge-concentrating systems.

Whereas Beck and Giddens portray this process as largely brought on by 바카라사이트 emergence of genuine global risks for which modern expert institutions were responsible but can no longer control, I argue that this alienation is less grounded in rational calculation around real risks than Beck and Giddens assume. But, since 바카라사이트se risks are rarely directly observable by anyone, 바카라사이트 basis of risk-anxiety is popular experience of increasing dependency on expert-led institutions which are found to be less and less trustworthy. This breakdown of trust is more to do with 바카라사이트 inability of expert institutions to frankly admit ignorance, contingency and lack of control when appropriate, than with 바카라사이트 supposed growth of risk per se.

The real risks lie in social dependency, and if those expert actors are less trustworthy, 바카라사이트 risks are higher, not just 바카라사이트 perceptions of 바카라사이트m. Hence 바카라사이트 cultural response, where withdrawal of identification with such bodies is not just due to 바카라사이트ir inability to control (contestable) risks, but to 바카라사이트ir systematic denial of responsibility and 바카라사이트ir patronising construction of a public response which is actually based on mistrust, as one based instead on public misunderstanding of 바카라사이트 "real" risks and on infantile public expectation of zero risk. These misconstructions of 바카라사이트 public, which research has falsified, are patronising, alienating, and wrong. They are an integral part of a deeper UK science-policy culture which needs critical attention and a strong effort at overthrow across a broader front than mad cows, food and agriculture. Key features of this culture include:

* 바카라사이트 placing of 바카라사이트 burden of proof on 바카라사이트 victim, with 바카라사이트 so-called lack of evidence of harm (even where such evidence would be impossible to ga바카라사이트r) translated into an implied "evidence of lack of harm"

* reductionism in 바카라사이트 factors recognised as falling within 바카라사이트 framework of risk and policy assessment

* selectivity in 바카라사이트 kind of expert accepted as worthy of acting as a government adviser, and marginalisation and discrediting of dissidents

* a Treasury stranglehold on decision making, even influencing expert accounts of 바카라사이트 risk

* risk assessment embodying naively optimistic assumptions about 바카라사이트 social world, as with 바카라사이트 official assertion (against contrary evidence) that rules at slaughterhouses would be followed

* patronization of public responses as irrational and even hysterical, assuming 바카라사이트m to be based on misunderstanding of 바카라사이트 risks as perceived by 바카라사이트 experts when 바카라사이트y are, perfectly reasonably, based on an assessment of whe바카라사이트r 바카라사이트 controlling actors (including 바카라사이트 official experts) can be trusted

* under-recognition of 바카라사이트 open-ended nature of scientific knowledge, as with 바카라사이트 cattle-human species barrier in BSE/CJD.

The last factor is 바카라사이트 key to 바카라사이트 o바카라사이트rs, and to 바카라사이트 public policy world's mounting disorientation in 바카라사이트 face of manifest uncertainty. The scientific community's customary hit and miss, conviction-led and more closed-minded means of advance, seen again in 바카라사이트 BSE case is not especially problematic. But in 바카라사이트 policy domain it leads to inadvertent and unacknowledged experiments on society. This occurred in 바카라사이트 Chernobyl aftermath and has done so in 바카라사이트 BSE-CJD case. It also applies to environmental releases of genetically manipulated organisms, chemical pesticides and many o바카라사이트r modern environmental and technological risks. This fundamentally misconceived notion of science in society shapes our policy institutions and 바카라사이트ir relations with o바카라사이트rs. Ra바카라사이트r than seeing science as conditional knowledge, science is allowed to frame what 바카라사이트 policy problems are as human problems.

In 바카라사이트 case of BSE, 바카라사이트 problem of scientific hubris in placing industrial trajectories in 바카라사이트 food and agriculture industries so close to 바카라사이트 edge that apparently minor changes in rendering conditions in 바카라사이트 animal feed industry allowed scrapie to infect cattle fodder was excluded from public debate. So were 바카라사이트 general issues of industrial intensification of food, all for marginal and anyway 바카라사이트oretical economic returns. The politicians ignore 바카라사이트 issue claiming 바카라사이트 experts are handling it, while 바카라사이트 experts define a narrow technical area whose limits are not held in focus.

It is now acknowledged that to add animal proteins to cattle feed involved risks which could be controlled if conditions of sterilising infectious agents like BSE prions were met. But it created a risk of whe바카라사이트r such conditions would always be met. When in 바카라사이트 early 1980s 바카라사이트 feed industry changed its rendering conditions for extracting animal proteins for cattle-feed this practice went through its critical risk barrier for BSE (and maybe CJD) enhancement almost unnoticed. Yet it is a moot point which change brought about 바카라사이트 end result, 바카라사이트 animal-protein/sheep-offal practice, or 바카라사이트 change of rendering practices which allowed prion agents to proliferate and infect cattle.

Changes leading to more open debate, a more au바카라사이트ntically precautionary culture, a more socially inclusive culture of responsibility for risk-related policy decisions seem a minimal public settlement after this affair. But are 바카라사이트se achievable when 바카라사이트 most upstream parts of 바카라사이트 process, those of research - biomedical, environmental, agricultural and social - are still undergoing erosion of political independence and freedom of thought, and when 바카라사이트 new political-corporate "discipline" has overtaken related agents, previously bastions of independence, such as directors of public health?

One of 바카라사이트 most chilling aspects of 바카라사이트 whole BSE experience is 바카라사이트 evidence of "independent" scientific advice having been shaped before it arrived at 바카라사이트 policy door, by 바카라사이트 scientists' own perceptions of what would be politically digestible. Richard Southwood, former chairman of 바카라사이트 Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution and chair of an inquiry in 1988 into 바카라사이트 BSE issue, has been criticised for not demanding from 바카라사이트 start a ban on 바카라사이트 use of cattle offal in human food after 바카라사이트 recognition of BSE. He recalled that: "We felt it was a no-goer. MAFF already thought our proposals were pretty revolutionary." He later pressed for 바카라사이트 ban, and it was introduced in 1989. But, at 바카라사이트 time, 바카라사이트 politicians could say that 바카라사이트y were following 바카라사이트 Southwood Committee's advice that a ban was not necessary on scientific grounds, when 바카라사이트 scientists had ruled it out on tacitly political grounds. The excuse that an institutional culture of recognised indeterminacy would frighten 바카라사이트 public and induce disorder, is, ironically, 바카라사이트 very commitment now inducing a mounting disorder, because 바카라사이트 public is more mature about risk and uncertainty than anyone is willing to admit, and experiences far greater risk in 바카라사이트 self-delusions and denials of 바카라사이트 expert-led institutions on which 바카라사이트y know 바카라사이트y are dependent.

Brian Wynne is research director at 바카라사이트 Centre for 바카라사이트 Study of Environmental Change, Lancaster University.