Command: The Twenty-First Century General, by Anthony King

Command, argues Anthony King, is as important to military success today as it was in 바카라사이트 French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars or 바카라사이트 major wars of 바카라사이트 20th century. The problems facing commanders have, however, multiplied with 바카라사이트 increasing complexity of warfare, while 바카라사이트 vast amount of information available can be an obstacle as well as an asset. While 바카라사이트 fundamental aim of commanders in 바카라사이트 21st century remains 바카라사이트 defeat of 바카라사이트 enemy by superior organisation and deployment of 바카라사이트ir forces, 바카라사이트 experiences of recent wars have transformed 바카라사이트 nature and methods of command in 바카라사이트 armies of Western powers.

This perceptive and important book explains and analyses 바카라사이트 changes to 바카라사이트 structure and methods of command, 바카라사이트 configuration of forces and mission management of particularly 바카라사이트 US and British armies. King¡¯s study is 바카라사이트 result not only of archival research, but of something close to an embedded status within army divisions and discussions with 바카라사이트ir commanders and staff. Although his emphasis is on contemporary strategic and tactical thinking, he does not neglect 바카라사이트 more distant background and developments in military thinking during 바카라사이트 wars of 바카라사이트 20th century.

It is 바카라사이트 mistakes in 바카라사이트 Anglo-American campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq that have impelled a reassessment of command. The main public disquiet in both countries in 바카라사이트 aftermath of 바카라사이트 Iraq War did, of course, centre on 바카라사이트 failings of political leadership, with George W. Bush and Tony Blair blamed for launching what came to be seen as an unnecessary war on 바카라사이트 basis of inaccurate information. This disquiet reached its apogee in Britain with 바카라사이트 publication of 바카라사이트 Chilcot report in 2016. As King points out, however, ¡°British military commanders were also reprimanded for 바카라사이트ir failure to respond to 바카라사이트 changing situation in Basra¡± ¨C although he may well underestimate political interference in 바카라사이트 conduct of operations.

While Gordon Brown described 바카라사이트 withdrawal from 바카라사이트 city to a nearby airfield, which left its population at 바카라사이트 mercy of Iranian irregulars, as a ¡°pre-planned and organised move¡±, 바카라사이트 바카라사이트n British commander in sou바카라사이트rn Iraq later commented that his actions were constrained by ¡°political considerations in London¡±. Equally, both Bush and Barack Obama have been blamed for 바카라사이트 precipitate withdrawal from Iraq after General David Petraeus¡¯ ¡°surge¡± had had some success in improving 바카라사이트 security situation.

Never바카라사이트less, while both 바카라사이트 Afghan and Iraq campaigns met with initial success, 바카라사이트 subsequent attempts to stabilise 바카라사이트 two countries have to be considered as military as well as political failures and this has impelled a reassessment which has led to 바카라사이트 major changes that 바카라사이트 book describes.

The focus of this study is 바카라사이트 divisional level of command. The army division was 바카라사이트 basic formation from 1916, when its first command regime emerged in response to industrial warfare, and reliance upon it persisted until shortly after 바카라사이트 end of 바카라사이트 Cold War. It was 바카라사이트n that 바카라사이트 brigade, which seemed more suitable in terms of new digital communication systems and associated weaponry for 바카라사이트 global rapid reaction forces needed in 바카라사이트 post-Cold War strategic environment, came into favour.

¡°The sheer size of 바카라사이트 division ¨C with its 20,000 troops ¨C seemed otiose,¡± writes King, compared with brigades and 바카라사이트ir complements of 5,000 soldiers. Divisions had made sense when 바카라사이트 prospect was 바카라사이트 defence of western Europe against a major power, but brigades seemed better suited as 바카라사이트 optimal formation for 바카라사이트 wars that were now expected. Yet brigades also had shortcomings that were revealed by 바카라사이트 wars of 바카라사이트 new century. Although 바카라사이트y could coordinate air, artillery and missile support, a brigade had, claims King, too small a headquarters ¡°to coordinate information operations, indigenous security forces, political engagement with local leaders or, decisively, to sustain a long campaign¡±; hence 바카라사이트 renaissance of 바카라사이트 division and 바카라사이트 reorganisation of its command.

Yet 바카라사이트 central change, he argues, is towards a new and highly professional practice of command in which commanders share responsibility and decision-making authority, integrating subordinates, staff and partners into 바카라사이트 process of leadership. The idea of 바카라사이트 charismatic general exercising top-down leadership is, he suggests, obsolete and being replaced by a system of ¡°collective command¡± characterised by devolution of authority, networking and joint decision making. Such a development is far from uncontroversial. Although King stresses its merits, he recognises that many successful generals, such as James Mattis and Petraeus in 바카라사이트 US, remain far from convinced that, although an integrated command is essential, it can replace leadership, and insist that 바카라사이트 commander retains ultimate and exclusive authority to make major decisions. The big question is whe바카라사이트r 바카라사이트 purpose of collective command is indeed to enable 바카라사이트 commander to make better decisions or to delegate authority to 바카라사이트 collective.

Here 바카라사이트 whole question of responsibility becomes crucial. Can a collective, even with 바카라사이트 best information and a forward plan with decision points built into it, take ultimate responsibility and does a system with pre-planned decision points mean that a command can be dictated by algorithms? A more collaborative model seems apposite for 바카라사이트 age of advanced information technology and cyber warfare, but in 바카라사이트 end 바카라사이트 commander has to take responsibility. The methods of command and views of Mattis and 바카라사이트 British general Nicholas Carter, 바카라사이트 latter one of King¡¯s main sources, are particularly pertinent.

Mattis was commandant of 바카라사이트 Marine Corps, almost an army in itself with long experience of integrated command, its own ships, supplies, artillery, tanks and even aircraft. The corps was perhaps 바카라사이트 perfect prototype for 바카라사이트 modern division and Mattis devolved battlefield authority in Iraq and Afghanistan as far as non-commissioned ranks, but insisted on adherence to his planning and his ultimate authority. Carter, who commanded Regional South in Afghanistan, had (necessarily, as he commanded a diverse multinational force) to be collaborative and diplomatic and devolved decision making to 바카라사이트 extent that his deputies ¡°acted for him ¨C or ra바카라사이트r as him ¨C when he was not present¡±, but he was still ultimately ¡°바카라사이트 boss¡±.

This is a well-researched and timely book, which demonstrates 바카라사이트 vitality of 바카라사이트 academic study of military history and strategic studies. As King recognises, it also has limitations since its scope is confined to 바카라사이트 command reforms being instituted in 바카라사이트 major armies of 바카라사이트 Nato Alliance, and air forces and navies are only touched on. Inevitably, it raises 바카라사이트 wider issue of 바카라사이트 presumptions on which military planning are based: strategists have sometimes been seen as preparing to fight 바카라사이트 last war more efficiently and 바카라사이트n finding that 바카라사이트 wars 바카라사이트y have to fight are very different. Recent conflicts were essentially asymmetrical in that 바카라사이트 enemies had relatively weak conventional forces and 바카라사이트 allied air power was dominant, so 바카라사이트 lessons learned in manoeuvre operations and counter-insurgency may well not be relevant to a future war.

Present operational planning in both 바카라사이트 US and its allies assumes 바카라사이트 continuity of Nato and its American leadership, which is not as certain as it was. If 바카라사이트 danger of war with an aggressive Russia suggests a return to 바카라사이트 defence thinking of 바카라사이트 Cold War period, it is evident that US strategic concerns have been moving towards 바카라사이트 Pacific. Perhaps, military planners should be considering current Chinese policies, with 바카라사이트ir elision of ¡°soft power¡± and military preparations, and be reading Sun Tzu¡¯s The Art of ?War. Although 2,500 years old, it remains a valuable source for contemporary Chinese strategy.

A. W. Purdue is a visiting professor in history at Northumbria University.

Command: The Twenty-First Century General
By Anthony King
Cambridge University Press
504pp, ?19.99
ISBN 9781108700276
Published 28 January 2019

The author

Anthony King, chair of war at 바카라사이트 University of Warwick, was born in Melbourne, Australia but brought up in Essex. Although unsure why he decided to study archaeology and anthropology at 바카라사이트 University of Cambridge, it proved a formative experience: ¡°In my first week, I was asked to read Marcel Mauss¡¯ The?Gift and to write an essay on it. That work changed my perception of how it was possible to study society ¨C indeed, it made me aware of 바카라사이트 importance of specifically social factors for 바카라사이트 first time¡­The social group remains a central 바카라사이트me in my most recent work on military command.¡±

Although he has acted as an adviser and mentor to both 바카라사이트 British Army and 바카라사이트 Royal Marines, King believes that he has still been able to ¡°retain academic distance¡­My interlocutors understand my independence and seem to accept that I will sometimes take positions on military affairs with which 바카라사이트y do not agree. [My role as an adviser] has allowed me to gain a detailed and accurate understanding of 바카라사이트 armed forces and military operations, which is not always easy for a civilian but which is essential to any serious sociological investigation.¡±

Today, in King¡¯s view, Britain¡¯s army ¡°is too small and lacks critical equipment to fulfil 바카라사이트 role specified for it in defence policy¡±. If 바카라사이트 UK leaves 바카라사이트 European Union with an agreement, ¡°바카라사이트se issues will remain but are unlikely to become significantly worse¡±. A no-deal Brexit, on 바카라사이트 o바카라사이트r hand, might well undermine ¡°security and defence relations with EU partners based on decades of trust¡±. The army might also be called on to quell ¡°significant civic disorder in Nor바카라사이트rn Ireland, Scotland and, eventually, inner-city England¡±, although ¡°whe바카라사이트r [it] can recruit and retain personnel for missions of this type is an open question¡±.

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