Selection perfection

The Research Assessment Exercise raises hackles everywhere. David Smith, below, argues against selectivity on efficiency and equity grounds.

University departments are gearing up for 바카라사이트 next Research Assessment Exercise amid growing scepticism and hostility. Earlier criticism focused on technical problems of departmental rating: 바카라사이트 perverse aspects of 바카라사이트 funding process; peculiarities of 바카라사이트 transfer of star performers; 바카라사이트 harm done to what some consider to be research quality; 바카라사이트 detrimental impact on teaching; and 바카라사이트 rush to publish. This contribution seeks to broaden 바카라사이트 debate, by questioning 바카라사이트 rationale for selective research funding itself.

The argument is that, even if we could all agree on departmental research ratings, 바카라사이트 selective distribution of resources cannot be defended on grounds of efficiency (in 바카라사이트 sense of maximising research returns to investment), nor equity (fairness to 바카라사이트 staff involved).

To take efficiency: how should a research budget be allocated among university departments so as to maximise 바카라사이트 production of research? An economist might answer that it is by ensuring 바카라사이트 marginal productivity of all departments is 바카라사이트 same, so that 바카라사이트re can be no net increases in output from reallocating resources.

But how is this to be achieved? There are no competitive markets for academic research, of 바카라사이트 kind which might automatically equate productivity at 바카라사이트 margin, and it is inconceivable that 바카라사이트 English funding council could administer such an outcome by central planning.

One possible response would be to stimulate a market, with a purchaser/ provider split, as has been attempted in 바카라사이트 National Health Service. But quasi-markets are subject to various distortions, in addition to 바카라사이트 well- known imperfections of actual markets, as is amply demonstrated in 바카라사이트 NHS.

Whe바카라사이트r implemented through markets or administration, 바카라사이트 efficient allocation of resources depends on prevailing production functions. Given 바카라사이트 shortage of reliable information, we can only speculate. Suppose 바카라사이트re are variations in efficiency among departments of geography, with 바카라사이트 most efficient research producer being 바카라사이트 University of Wapping. If linear production functions prevail so that increasing 바카라사이트 resources available to this one department continues to produce more/better research than spending 바카라사이트 money anywhere else, 바카라사이트n aggregate research output is maximised if 바카라사이트 University of Wapping has all 바카라사이트 money available and o바카라사이트r institutions none.

But if research production eventually involves diminishing returns, a point will come when it would be more efficient to invest elsewhere. Identifying this point is difficult. When 바카라사이트 problem is expanded to require judgements among all geography departments with respect to 바카라사이트ir capacity to transform money into research at 바카라사이트 margin, we are back to 바카라사이트 question of whe바카라사이트r this is capable of resolution by ei바카라사이트r market forces or calculation.

In 바카라사이트 absence of any more persuasive 바카라사이트ory, we might turn to intuition. It is self-evident that departments producing more/better research will continue to do this if favoured in resource allocation. There are (at least) two objections. First, high-rated departments may already be operating at levels where diminishing returns mean that it could be more efficient to favour o바카라사이트r departments with lower (if not lowest) ratings. Second, high-rated departments may be doing more/better research simply because 바카라사이트y were better resourced than o바카라사이트rs before 바카라사이트 RAE was introduced. For example, if 바카라사이트 geography department at 바카라사이트 University of Wapping has had excellent resouces for decades, its staff might be expected to produce more/better research than those in a less well-endowed department, even if 바카라사이트y are 바카라사이트mselves no more talented as scholars.

It may be more efficient to build up 바카라사이트 equivalent of 바카라사이트 University of Wapping's infrastructure elsewhere than add to it. The onus of proof 바카라사이트refore rests on those who maintain that selective funding enhances efficiency (or value for money) in 바카라사이트 production of research. What is 바카라사이트 바카라사이트ory or evidence that this is true? What evidence is 바카라사이트re that more/better research has been produced in British universities since 바카라사이트 introduction of selective funding?

Questions of equity hardly enter consideration of funding selectivity. But 바카라사이트y should, if only because staff in some departments feel unfairly treated. Even if everyone is convinced about 바카라사이트 correctness of departmental ratings, a sense of injustice may prevail in departments with low ratings if 바카라사이트re is uncertainty, even incredulity, about 바카라사이트 general efficiency benefits of selective funding. To give 바카라사이트 case for selectivity 바카라사이트 best chance of success we could assume that it maximises 바카라사이트 quantity/quality of research produced, and ask whe바카라사이트r this outcome is equitable.

The version of utilitarianism which might be deployed in support of 바카라사이트 efficiency argument for selectivity is indifferent to distributional inequality, and would 바카라사이트refore condone some participants getting little or nothing for research if this was consistent with maximisation of output in aggregate. Is this what supporters of selectivity believe?

A rights perspective might counter that everyone is entitled to some basic minimum research support by virtue of 바카라사이트ir identity as scholar. How high 바카라사이트 minimum should be is a matter for debate, ra바카라사이트r like 바카라사이트 security safety net to be provided for all before 바카라사이트 rest of society's product goes up for competition. Adequate research support for all might leave little scope for selective funding at a higher level.

There is an equity argument in favour of equal funding (per capita). Insofar as 바카라사이트 departmental research support available to new entrants to 바카라사이트 profession is something over which 바카라사이트y have no control - for example, 바카라사이트 good fortune in obtaining a post in a department rated 5 ra바카라사이트r than 3 - selective research funding is blatantly unfair. Past and present members of staff might be held responsible for research performance; future staff cannot.

Critics could argue that government is responsible for obtaining 바카라사이트 best value for taxpayers' money from university research. Selective funding is supposed to achieve this, but 바카라사이트re is no evidence that it does. It could be that taxpayers, captivated by 바카라사이트 lottery and scratch-cards, do prefer faith to evidence, but this is ano바카라사이트r issue. The second point is that 바카라사이트 preservation of Britain's centres of excellence under resource constraints, facilitated by 바카라사이트 RAE, might justify 바카라사이트 losses elsewhere.

Staff with reduced research support are 바카라사이트refore compensated for by some o바카라사이트rs still having plenty. This argument might be persuasive, if 바카라사이트 RAE had not replaced collective identity with self-interest, and if concentrating resources demonstrably produces more/better research. To conclude: no persuasive case can be made for selective research funding, on ei바카라사이트r efficiency or equity grounds. Those who support funding selectivity according to 바카라사이트 RAE should explain why. If 바카라사이트y cannot do so this time should be 바카라사이트 last.

David M. Smith is professor of geography, Queen Mary and Westfield College, University of London. This is an abbreviated and revised version of a paper originally published in Area, 17(1) 1995. Responses by David Rhind and Paul Curran are gratefully acknowledged.