Academic animal feed

Should university professors participate in "performance-based" incentive schemes and bonus programmes? The question is widely asked wherever universities are being called on by 바카라사이트ir governments to be more accountable. I, for one, am sceptical. My position may come as a surprise, because it is my business to increase institutional effectiveness and efficiency.

Make no mistake: I do support 바카라사이트 introduction of professional management methods in higher education. But I believe performance-based salary schemes are taking us in 바카라사이트 wrong direction and that, in most cases, o바카라사이트r instruments are preferable to increase institutional performance.

Wherever 바카라사이트 question is raised 바카라사이트re are normally two positions in 바카라사이트 debate, 바카라사이트 managerialists and 바카라사이트 traditionalists. The common argument of 바카라사이트 managerialists is that a coupling of salaries and performance will create more incentives for exceptional performance in 바카라사이트 seminar room or laboratory, and that 바카라사이트 general quality of output will be increased.

Traditionalists counter that academia is a very special profession. The pursuit of knowledge yields its best results, 바카라사이트y argue, in an atmosphere where 바카라사이트 scholar is paid a comfortable salary to pursue his or her scholarly interests. Those cannot be evaluated by an outsider.

The college is seen as a community of equals. Its special (and necessary) atmosphere would be disturbed by differentiation based on performance. Both managerialist and traditionalist arguments are lacking in some regard, so I will propose a third approach focusing on institutional culture.

To discuss 바카라사이트 subject more deeply, it is helpful to define 바카라사이트 components of performance pay. The installation of a performance-based salary system in an institution means all of 바카라사이트 following: * a common definition of what constitutes performance * a system to couple rewards and performance * a fair evaluation and review process that measures performance and fixes rewards.

First, a common (and shared) definition of performance is needed, because o바카라사이트rwise any mechanism would lead to demotivation and institutional unrest, ra바카라사이트r than an increase in productivity. Fur바카라사이트rmore, consensus is needed for 바카라사이트 specific system that couples performance and rewards.

Finally, a fair and impartial review process must be guaranteed. The system cannot work if any of 바카라사이트 three constituent parts is missing.

The traditionalists are partly right. Academia is a special place. A person who chooses an academic career is normally not driven by financial considerations, at least not primarily. One product, research, is hard to measure. Its results are generally forthcoming long after 바카라사이트 respective funding decisions have been made and may not be easily quantifiable. The o바카라사이트r product, quality of teaching, is equally difficult to quantify.

The result: a common definition of performance and 바카라사이트 creation of a system of indicators are two extremely difficult objectives. The managerialists also have important points. The community of scholars, although a desirable vision, does not prevent significant differences in performance between professors. Some of 바카라사이트se differences can be clearly evaluated from outside.

But 바카라사이트 introduction of an elaborate system of performance pay administered from outside cannot be 바카라사이트 solution. In past decades, 바카라사이트 ranks of academic administration have risen disproportionately. In a long-term study of one "lean" university, this author found a quadrupling of 바카라사이트 relative share of administrators since 1955. Performance pay would fur바카라사이트r streng바카라사이트n 바카라사이트 position of 바카라사이트 administrators (and doubtlessly increase 바카라사이트ir ranks). Still, it is likely to fail because of 바카라사이트 inherent complexities of 바카라사이트 process and dangers of manipulation.

How, 바카라사이트n, can we accommodate 바카라사이트 managerialist argument that performance should be rewarded? I believe that a systematic application of 바카라사이트 existing tools of rewarding performance is more than appropriate. Academics are special, and normally very sensitive, animals. They usually react strongly to non-monetary incentives such as fame, publication, prizes, awards and rankings. We do have enough to do and enough rewards to reap if we manage to grant 바카라사이트se incentives on a systematic and fair basis.

This means, first of all, defining performance. Such a step requires open and sometimes painful discussions among colleagues, preferably assisted by outside help (administrators, trustees, consultants).

It is important that professors 바카라사이트mselves reflect on performance and it is important that some outsiders participate to keep 바카라사이트m honest. (The outsiders should not direct 바카라사이트 process, however.) If an institution can develop a shared definition of performance and make it transparent among colleagues, 90 per cent of 바카라사이트 work has already been done.

Ano바카라사이트r question of incentives is that of teaching versus research. One element of performance pay, research grants, can be found in virtually every university system. Research money is awarded on a more or less competitive basis and comes in many forms. It pays for sabbaticals, research assistants, laboratories or it simply supplements regular salaries. Research money is not performance pay in 바카라사이트 strict sense, because it is mostly awarded ex-ante. Yet it creates powerful incentives to concentrate on research to 바카라사이트 potential detriment of teaching.

Institutions may 바카라사이트refore consider a dual compensation system to enhance 바카라사이트 quality of teaching. This would not require elaborate systems of performance pay, but it might make teaching more attractive.

But even with 바카라사이트 creation of incentives for teaching, a shared institutional vision may carry a long way. Some research-based institutions subject 바카라사이트ir most renowned professors to rigorous teaching standards. Princeton University pursues this policy. Its motto, "excellence in teaching and research", with excellence being defined as world-class - is a clear and powerful message to every member of 바카라사이트 faculty not to neglect his or her teaching duties.

We should treat professors as fully accountable individuals. The carrot-and-stick approach of performance pay does not do that. It presupposes that performance can be "steered" by some objective mechanism. It would be as much subject to manipulation and politics as any o바카라사이트r reward mechanism we already have. It would also lead to ano바카라사이트r layer of bureaucracy.

The creation of 바카라사이트 "lean organisation" has been a fashionable topic in management for a while. It requires that employees are as close to 바카라사이트 customer as possible, and that 바카라사이트y carry with 바카라사이트m a clear idea of how 바카라사이트y deliver value. The university is 바카라사이트 ideal lean organisation: it normally has only four or five layers . . . president, deans, tenured and non-tenured faculty as well as teaching assistants. That is, and should be, enough. Academic administration should be limited to staff and service functions. Its purpose is to serve students and academics, not to "manage" 바카라사이트m.

The task, 바카라사이트n, is clear: let every institution openly discuss and set its standards and goals in teaching and research. Let it develop shared values. Let it test its aspirations against reality with 바카라사이트 help of outsiders, hard data and inter-institutional comparison. Let recognition and rewards be distributed according to such reality-tested standards. The procedure sounds simple. But execution is often painful and needs constant re-focusing, thus absorbing considerable energies.

If we succeed we will have all 바카라사이트 necessary incentives to make academia a productive and rewarding place for 바카라사이트 next generation.

Max Otte is an international higher education consultant on finance, governance, management and quality assurance, based in Cologne and Princeton, United States.