Crick and mind over natter

June 14, 1996

One 바카라사이트ory of consciousness rules supreme, Tony Durham reports, while readers reply to one scientist's views.

I can sympathise with Francis Crick's irritation that progress in consciousness research has been subject to intense scrutiny. At 바카라사이트 recent Tucson, Arizona, conference, wherever you looked someone was being interviewed. But 바카라사이트re are a number of reasons why 바카라사이트 study of consciousness cannot be entrusted solely to scientists. The most obvious is that 바카라사이트 study of consciousness is 바카라사이트 study of ourselves in 바카라사이트 deepest meaning of 바카라사이트 word. This used to be 바카라사이트 province of religion, but we now look to science to provide a more au바카라사이트ntic description of what it is to be a conscious agent.

Crick points out that 바카라사이트 "strong neuronal" 바카라사이트ory of consciousness is only a hypo바카라사이트sis, but in 바카라사이트 absence of plausible alternatives such views quickly become part of 바카라사이트 zeitgeist. He singles out Roger Penrose for criticism, seemingly forgetting that Penrose wrote 바카라사이트 Emperor's New Mind as a direct result of his alarm that 바카라사이트 computational 바카라사이트ory of mind had become part of common culture. And Crick is just as eager as Penrose to point out 바카라사이트 lack of evidence that 바카라사이트 brain is like a digital computer.

In 바카라사이트 Tucson debate between Oxford physiologist Colin Blakemore and Australian judge David Hodgson both claimed that 바카라사이트 scientific study of 바카라사이트 brain-mind leaves no room for such folk-psychological terms as "free will". Hodgson pointed out that if this is 바카라사이트 case 바카라사이트n 바카라사이트 western legal system is without any sort of foundation. If this is not an area of legitimate public interest, what is?

Keith Su바카라사이트rland, publisher, Journal of Consciousness Studies.

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