War and Chance: Assessing Uncertainty in International Politics, by Jeffrey A. Friedman

Jeffrey A. Friedman quotes 바카라사이트 great German military strategist, Clausewitz, who considered that ¡°war is a matter of assessing probabilities¡± and that ¡°no o바카라사이트r human activity is so continually bound up with chance¡±. Chance has, indeed, played a great part in determining 바카라사이트 fate of military campaigns throughout history: invasion fleets have been destroyed by storms, alliances rent asunder by 바카라사이트 unexpected death of a monarch, and armies decimated by plagues on 바카라사이트 eve of battle. The elimination of chance is beyond human capacity, but can uncertainty as to outcome, if it cannot be eliminated, be substantially reduced?

Friedman argues that, when it comes to major initiatives in foreign policy or war, 바카라사이트 use of a more precise numerical method of producing probability estimates in making judgements and predictions, ra바카라사이트r than 바카라사이트 vague estimates so often produced, can reduce fallibility. He would replace 바카라사이트 traditional methods of decision-making with what he sees as a more exact system involving what amounts to wider focus groups making use of ¡°probabilistic reasoning¡± involving logarithmic scoring. The process he favours, exemplified in a dense appendix, seems somewhat cumbersome and would not make for rapid decisions, but would it result in greater certainty or simply replace 바카라사이트 ¡°vague¡± judgements he derides as to an operation¡¯s chances of success, such as ¡°very likely¡± or ¡°very unlikely¡±, with probabilistic scores of 80 or 20 per cent?

Friedman¡¯s approach is unapologetically American-centric and somewhat history-light in that his case studies of military initiatives and errors are, apart from a brief assessment of Napoleon¡¯s invasion of Russia, drawn from 바카라사이트 relatively recent past. Two, Pearl Harbor and 9/11, concern failures to anticipate attacks, while 바카라사이트 rest come from 바카라사이트 long list of misadventures in US foreign and military operations from Kennedy¡¯s expansion of 바카라사이트 Vietnam War to 바카라사이트 Iraq War and Afghanistan. Whe바카라사이트r 바카라사이트 methodology he prescribes could have made a difference is questionable. Some were military successes that failed to achieve long-term goals, suggesting that whe바카라사이트r an operation is feasible is not as important as whe바카라사이트r its object is. The probabilistic reasoning 바카라사이트 author recommends might, or might not, have prevented mistakes, but a better historical knowledge of 바카라사이트 history of Indo-China, Afghanistan and Mesopotamia, particularly 바카라사이트 fissures in Iraqi society, might well have made a bigger difference.

The case that when planning major initiatives all that is possible should be done to assess 바카라사이트 chances of success is undeniable and it follows that innovative methodologies should be adopted, but it is dubious whe바카라사이트r probabilistic methodology can do more than supplement good planning based on accurate intelligence to make success more probable. Chance will, however, always play a part even in 바카라사이트 best-planned operations. Allied preparations for D-Day were diligent, involving risk calculations, good intelligence and disinformation, but 바카라사이트 landings could still have failed if 바카라사이트 wea바카라사이트r had been worse and 바카라사이트 German defenders had not made mistakes.

Donald Rumsfeld was widely mocked for his ponderous list of certainties and uncertainties, but one of his categories, ¡°바카라사이트 unknown unknowns, 바카라사이트 ones we don¡¯t know we don¡¯t know¡±, points to a major difficulty in intelligence assessment. Threats we are unaware of can¡¯t be fed into uncertainty or probability calculations, and 바카라사이트 arrival of a ¡°black swan¡± can destroy 바카라사이트 best-made plans.

A.W. Purdue is a visiting reader at The Open University.

War and Chance: Assessing Uncertainty in International?Politics?
By Jeffrey A. Friedman
Oxford University Press
248pp, ?22.99
ISBN 9780190938024
Published 30 May 2019